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CORE CONCEPTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
There are two broad theories of international relations: realism and
liberalism. It is generally accepted that the international system —made up of
states, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations — is
anarchic, meaning that there is no actor that polices the system.⁸ Theories
vary on which of these concepts matter in studying international relations, but
for the most part, these are accepted elements of the study of international
relations as a whole. As theories, both realism and liberalism agree that the
state is the primary actor in the international system. For realists, the state
acts primarily to ensure their own security by pursuing power relative to other
states, usually through military or material strength. This type of action is
often characterized as rational and brutal.⁹ ¹⁰ Contrary to realists, liberals
emphasize the importance of diplomacy, and believe that using international
institutions can produce harmonious multilateral cooperation.¹¹ The
important element to note is that realists emphasize that state behavior can be
explained rationally through the perpetual pursuit of security.¹² Furthermore,
realists maintain that states more likely to distrust and minimize reliance on
other states, because it is difficult and usually costly to overcome
communication barriers and cooperate.¹³ Liberals believe that states can
overcome this distrust of other states and cooperate through intermediaries
like the United Nations (UN). Many explanations of populists in international
relations argue that their general behavior is consistent with how we
characterize realist states.¹⁴ However, understanding populism more broadly
will show that, while there are some trends in the general behavior of populist
states, their actual policies have little pattern.
Also present in the liberal approach is the importance of domestic
characteristics; in other words, the type of government a state has affects that
state’s international behavior. While this is debated, the theory of a
‘democratic peace’ is widely accepted. This theory holds that democracies
rarely fight each other, and it is often assumed that this is because of the
political culture of democracies and their ability to recognize a common
nature.¹⁵ In a democratic system, civil society is able to hold their government
accountable to international commitments and express their will on
international decisions. However, the need to appeal to civil society isn’t
necessarily restricted to democracies. More generally, states at the
international level are constrained by domestic constituencies.¹⁶ Behavior in
the international system can impact domestic behavior “by strengthening and
weakening domestic groups or providing credibility at the domestic level.”¹⁷
Based on this assumption, a populist regime type likely has an impact on
international behavior.
The last concept to understand is the difference between revisionist and
st t s o states, as populist states are often assumed to be inherently
revisionist. Status quo states are expected to adhere to current norms while
Over the last twenty years populist parties, particularly right-wing ones,
have been increasing in number around the globe. Concurrently, the world has
globalized, and neoliberal practices of isse ire economics have led to
economic inequality in global and local spheres.¹ ² ³ ower that once sat in the
hands of local elites now lies with global ones.⁴ iscontented by the broken
promises of modernity, liberalization, and economic prosperity, populists
have risen as an expression of anger against the current system, but also hope
for change. Within populism, this division is described as left and right
populism. opulists like Bernie Sanders in the United States, and movements
like odemos in Spain, coexist with far-right actors from Hungary and oland
to India, Turkey, and the hilippines.⁵ ⁶ Because domestic political regimes
impact international behavior, the way we understand populism will change
how we analyze populists in the international system. Therefore, an actor-
centered approach to international behavior will be necessary to
understanding state behavior, particularly that of populist states.
The goals of this paper are to provide a definition of populism, identify
some key characteristics, and introduce a key controversy within populist
literature. To achieve this, I outline the dominant understanding of populists
in international relations as it relates to concepts in I theory. I then analyze
what this understanding of populism means for this characterization of
populist states. Finally, I provide a brief outline of the issues plaguing the
future of the liberal world order, and how this understanding of populist state
behavior may interact with such issues.
I conclude that populism is a constantly shifting term and while the left
right distinction remains valuable, we need a definition of populism that
allows us to incorporate an individual state’s context into analysis of state
behavior. opulist states do not inherently want to radically change the
international system, but usually maintain centralized and personalized
leadership.⁷ Understanding populist leaders and their movements will lead to
a better understanding of their behavior in the international system.
Considering the CO I - crisis and the impending power transition likely to
take place between China and the United States, populism in the international
system is likely to have destabilizing effects, though in some cases populists in
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revisionist states work to change the system in some radical way. evisionist
states are usually lesser powers rising in strength which suggests that there is
a link between emerging powers and revisionist behavior (though this is not
always the case). For example, the United States could interpret China’s recent
behavior as revisionist. China is a rising power and likely to rival the United
States politically soon. Alternatively, the US likely sees the United ingdom as
a status quo state, and therefore does not view the U as a challenge to its
hegemony.¹⁸
How states interpret the system is important for understanding their
reactions to other states’ behavior. egime types are a huge element of this
calculation. Therefore, while populist states are often interpreted through a
realist lens, looking at their regime type and interactions in international
organizations reveals a more nuanced picture.
WHAT IS POPULISM?
Now that we have outlined some general concepts in I theory relevant
to this paper, I will cover some prominent theories of populism and outline a
basic definition. There are five prominent theories surrounding populism, all
of which emphasize certain characteristics or tactics of populism. The three
that are important for this analysis are Mudde, Mouffe, and Muller. This trio
of scholars is not comprehensive, but they do represent three main strains of
thought within the populism scholarship. While populism today is highly
contextual, which leads to these many approaches, there are common
elements across all these theories.¹⁹ ²⁰ As populism is vague and wide-
reaching, in order to critique theories of populism in I I will lay down a
baseline definition based on these approaches. We will accept Margaret
Canovan’s conclusion that populism consists of a dynamic between the people
and the elites.²¹ We will also accept that the discourse of populists pits the
people against elites and, debatably, against an “other.”²² opulists organize
around a single unifying leader that claims to represent the true will of the
people.²³ opulists are disenchanted with the status quo, which they see as
corrupt. This usually coalesces around a grievance, which is typically economic
in nature.²⁴ opulists blame elites for this grievance. Today’s economic
problems are blamed on technocratic elites and “experts,” who populists
believe have become disconnected, corrupt, and ultimately unable to carry out
the will of the people.²⁵ ²⁶ opulists form coalitions by using rhetorical tools
and the public arena.²⁷ ²⁸ Therefore, the primary tool of populists and
populist leaders is discursive.²⁹
There are several approaches to populism that highlight specific aspects
as more important than others. So, while most theories of populism share
concepts (like the antagonization of the elite), it is important to explain the
three specific definitions that contribute significantly to the debates had about
populism, especially in the international system. These are the ideological,
logical, and discursive approaches.³⁰ First, the ideological approach focuses
on the ability of the political scientist to measure populism. Adherents to the
ideological approach claim that measuring populism is difficult, because
populism never exists in a pure form or by itself.³¹ This gives rise to the ‘thin-
centered ideology,’ which allows scholars to identify the core attributes of
populism across different contexts. Second, the logical approach looks at
populism s ontological status.³² Adherents to this approach, like post-Marxist
scholars Laclau andMoffe, look at populism to analyze its core values and how
they in uence democratic political life. This view is useful because it imagines
populism as a way of thinking about democracy as opposed to a specific
antagonistic relationship between the people and the elites. Therefore,
populism can have a democratic or an authoritarian bend. Third, the
discursive approach focuses on the discourse of populists, and the underlying
dynamic between “the people” and “the elite.”³³ This dynamic produces “an
anti status-quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically
dividing society between ‘the people’ (as the underdogs) and its ‘other’.”³⁴
This approach (the Muller approach) considers populism to be inherently
antagonistic and right wing. These different approaches change how we
analyze the performance of populists domestically and internationally.
I expand on all these approaches to illustrate that populism is a dynamic
concept. So, while I present a succinct definition at the outset, there are
complexities within populism that manifest in scholarship and at the
international level. While many characteristics remain the same across
populist movements, the language used and the formation of the populist
group varies. For example, in the United States, Bernie Sanders and onald
Trump are both populists. However, their rhetoric is different; they blame
different corners of society for their grievances, and they use different
rhetorical tactics to emphasize different ideals for society. This point is crucial
for understanding the internal inconsistencies of populism. opulism does not
directly lead to specific policy outcomes, but is instead a way of doing politics.
This context-specific approach leads to radically different outcomes at the
international level.
The main debate within populism literature now is the existence of a left
and right populism.³⁵ Mouffe argues that a left populism has the potential to
reinvigorate agonistic democracy, a democratic style that emphasizes healthy
contestation of ideas, whereas right populism pursues an antagonistic
democracy, where debate is more like a fight to the death.³⁶ Adherents of
Muller, on the other hand, assert that populism is at its core a re ection of
pluralism.³⁷ ³⁸ Based on this distinction, populism can either be an
authoritarian degradation of democratic institutions or a powerful democratic
surge owing from the people upwards into government.³⁹ But is there room
for a left version of populism in international relations
POPULISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
opulists are typically painted as revisionist or regressive. opulist
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behavior also seems to fall in line with realism, prioritizing state security in
their international behavior. However, a ‘liberal’ lens reveals that the decisions
that populist states make are more nuanced than simply ‘security above all
else.’ At the international level, populist states are assumed to eschew norms
of cooperation, because under populist rhetoric those practices service the
global technocratic elites and free riders (racial minorities) that oppress the
authentic demos (the only legitimate ‘people’ in a democracy).⁴⁰ ⁴¹ According
to this logic, populist leaders cannot be seen to be in agreement with elites,
because to agree is to forfeit the will of the people back into the hands of
corruption.⁴² ⁴³ ⁴⁴ Therefore, even when it seems illogical to outsiders,
populist leaders must assert their will above all else. At the international level,
this means viewing international organizations and relationships as tools to
achieve national goals instead of parts of a normative system of cooperation.⁴⁵
opulists in the international system impact international law by
changing the atmosphere in which existing laws are interpreted and the
environment in which new laws are created.⁴⁶ One tactic is the threat of
leaving international organizations or agreements. This type of threat is
traditionally taboo, but populist states (most notably the United States under
Trump) can more comfortably use this tool.⁴⁷ This changes the stakes, and
therefore the environment, of the construction and interpretation of
international law. If the biggest donor can abandon an agreement with few
consequences, there is a serious threat to the integrity of the international
legal regime. opulists are also characterized by disintegration from
international trade agreements,⁴⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ and will also favor bilateral
agreements and organizations over multilateral ones, though this is
contested.⁵¹ ⁵² The reasoning is that populist leaders see international
agreements as constraints to achieving national goals.⁵³ Therefore, some
assert that populists are more likely to create their own institutions, but this
behavior has less robust evidence.⁵⁴ ⁵⁵ ⁵⁶ ⁵⁷ These behaviors, though not
unique to populists, are claimed to be common among them.
The behavior of populist states in the international legal regime shows
that populist states do not typically view international cooperation through
institutions as beneficial. Tactics of recontextualization and disintegration are
evidence of populist states reimagining the system as a tool for national goals
as opposed to an established normative system of cooperation.⁵⁸ In this way,
we can see how cooperation and noncooperation are used as coercive tools.
The decision to engage in legal institutions in this way is evidence of a foreign
policy oriented around the state, its security concerns and domestic agendas,
as opposed to the maintenance of established norms and institutions of
cooperation. We can see this in the American approach to foreign relations
under the Trump administration. The “America First” rhetoric prioritized
American interests above all and deprioritized many collective benefits that
could have been gained through a higher commitment to cooperation.
Additionally, populist leaders seem to securitize economic issues.⁵⁹ To
securitize an issue is to describe it as a threat to the security of a country. To
securitize the economy increases the government’s role in ensuring the health
and stability of the economy. By securitizing the economy, populist leaders
allow themselves to centralize power and portray often normal economic
interactions as existential threats. For example, the trade war between the
United States and China is seen as a threat not only to economic stability but
to the very social fabric of the United States.⁶⁰ In other words, the external
threat, China, is not only a threat to the American economy, but to the very
core of what it means to be an American. This existential threat enhances the
populist leader’s domestic support, and lends them credibility.⁶¹ The level of
threat also helps legitimate the populist government’s consolidation of power.
Together, it is assumed that populists reimagine the international system,
legal institutions, and economic issues, as domestic political tools, and
security threats. This feeds into the idea that populist states are authoritarian,
reactionary, and revisionist.
ANALYSIS
However, much of populist literature restricts itself to the “right-wing,”
antagonistic perspective. This has huge implications for state behavior. The
way we define populism changes our prognosis for the future of the
international system. The definitions that allow for variation and context
within populism domestically have more complex expectations for populist
foreign policy and behavior. Allowing for the left right distinction within our
understanding of populism, and even challenging this categorization, will help
us better interpret the future of the liberal world order.
To discuss this point I will compare three articles by authors Heike
rieger; Sandra estradi and ohannes lagemann; and zg r zdamar and
rdem Ceydilek. Both estradi and lagemann and rieger use Muller s
definition of populism, emphasizing anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. However,
estradi and lagemann also emphasize the ideological approach, and
zdamar and Ceydilek advocate for it with their research. While reiger
recognizes the value of an actor-centered approach like Mudde’s, she is more
concerned with finding behavior general to all populists. So, while rieger’s
findings are valuable, they are inherently generalized. For the sake of the
following analysis, the ideological approach and the actor-centered approach
are largely the same. However, the concept of an actor-centered approach
captures more, understanding a populist state’s behavior within its broader
international and domestic context rather than ust through ideology.
All three papers also look at different areas of international relations and
of the world. rieger tries to capture all populist governments in an
international legal context, while estradi and lagemann focus explicitly on
the global south for a more general look at foreign policy behavior. zdamar
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and Ceydilek look exclusively at uropean opulist adical ight ( )
leaders for trends in international policy. Highlighting their different
disciplinary focuses matters because doing so highlights the elements all three
papers have in common.
ach paper comes to different conclusions around the attitude and
consequences of populism in I . rieger concludes that populism is a
fundamental challenge to the status quo. By changing international law
through non-compliance, withdrawal, and legal cherry-picking, populists tend
to be revisionist states out to achieve their own agendas. On the other hand,
estradi and lagemann conclude that populist states are restricted from
being as radically revisionist, belligerent, or reticent as they are commonly
believed to be. estradi and lagemann argue that state status seeking⁶² and
embeddedness⁶³ in international institutions restrict rapid unilateral action.
Instead, populist states tend to centralize and personalize their decision
making while mostly reinforcing existing norms.⁶⁴ zdamar and Ceydilek
corroborate this last point. leaders lack a common policymaking pattern
but tend to have slightly more con ictual world views. Therefore, the authors
suggest that “agent orientedmodels of beliefs to capture themicro foundations
of strategic interactions between states is more appropriate to analyze populist
state behavior.”⁶⁵ So, while rieger finds that populists are revisionists and
estradi and lagemann find that they are constrained by their system and
functional status quo, zdamar and Ceydilek find that populist behavior
depends largely on the state itself.
While these papers come to different conclusions, they all highlight two
important themes. First, they highlight the personalized, centralized, and
in uential nature that domestic politics, specifically populism, can have in the
I system. Their findings suggest that analyzing populism at the individual
level — that is, the leader leader group — may be more beneficial to look at
when it comes to understanding populist policies. International politics is
shifting, and it is likely to be more unpredictable than we generally think.
Second, populism is contextual. rieger sees populism as a structured
way of thinking; estradi and lagemann see it as a thin centered ideology;
zdamar and Ceydilek conclude that an “agent-oriented model” is important
in order to better understand populist state behavior.⁶⁶ While this level of
macroanalysis using micro foundations (the actor-centered approach) may
seem infeasible, earlier work by zdamar could be an answer. Combining an
expected utility model and international relations data, zdamar retroactively
forecasted Iran’s international bargaining regarding its nuclear program in
, , and .⁶⁷ Because this model evaluates the strategic decision
making of specific actors and how they interact with each other, context
specific assumptions could be introduced into the model. Therefore,
researchers could generate profiles and analyze state specific behavior at an
international level. This method is not all-knowing, and it does have its
weaknesses, but it is a good place to start analyzing populist international
behavior and how it compares (and even competes) with that of non-populist
states.
THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER
A lot of anxiety surrounds the recent global rise in populism, which has
increased research into the topic. Most refer to populism as a gateway to
authoritarianism through heightened levels of nationalism. Therefore, a
populist movement is usually seen as evidence of backsliding, or an
abandonment of the road to democracy and the international liberal order.
However, populism is not inherently right-wing, xenophobic, and divisive.
ven within right-wing populism actual policy decisions are inconsistent.
These inconsistencies make the impact of populists at the international level
hard to evaluate and predict.
ven more uncertain is the rise of China and the potential power con ict
between the United States and China. The economic rise of Asia as a whole
over the last century, and the specific rise of China in the last thirty years, has
been shocking toWestern leaders. It has made theWestern elite anxious about
the continued existence of the postwar international order, which was
established by the Allied powers and dominated by the United States’
hegemony. However, it appears that the United States hegemony is fading,
perhaps by its own hand, as seen with the election of onald Trump in
and Bernie Sanders’ populist campaigns in and . The two are often
used to illustrate the range of populism and democratic deterioration in the
United States. China has surpassed the United States in , but has yet to
become as culturally dominant as the United States is.⁶⁸ xacerbated by the
United States’ ‘pivot to Asia’ in and the more recent trade war initiated by
former- resident Trump, relations between China and the United States have
become even more tense. The global community is anticipating a massive
power transition away from the “Western World,” which has dominated the
international system since the turn of the th century.
Furthermore, the CO I - pandemic is a global problem that will once
again alter the potential in uence populist states have on the international
system. Times of crisis usually increase state capacity and autonomy; this is
likely to compound on the already centralizing and personalizing effect
populists have on state behavior and further increase populist state power.⁶⁹
⁷⁰ This could be a boon for more right-wing populists, because conservatives
already have an affinity for authoritarian behavior. ight-wing populist
rhetoric is malleable and generally feeds off a national crisis narrative.⁷¹ It is
also likely that the pandemic has pushed populist discourses online, making
physical appearances, like rallies, more powerful.⁷² Most articles about
CO I - and populist governments has focused on their failures in dealing
with the crisis, especially because the centralization of power and the
repudiation of technocratic and scientific know-how has been essential to
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combating the pandemic.⁷³ Some claim that the populist left’s failure to
successfully address the pandemic has spelled its end, while others point out
that left populists can still embrace technology and environmentalism as a
source of democratization (like in Taiwan).⁷⁴ In other words, the aspirations
for a left populism have been thrown into doubt by this crisis. However, there
is hope that CO I - could also serve as an opening for left populists to
incorporate right populists into the democratic movement by providing
sympathetic narratives of protection and a common goal.
How populism, and democracy more generally, will fare in this changing
environment is difficult to predict. Many populists seek change, but they also
prioritize the protection of their own state. In this way, populist states
generally act more like realists than liberals, but a liberalist perspective is
essential for understanding their behavior. They are not necessarily
revisionist, and are instead self-preserving, protecting themselves against the
neoliberal system that has wrought rapid change, instability, and inequality.
States have responded to globalization and the rise of neoliberalism
differently, so the actor-centered approach to analyzing state behavior is
important in not overgeneralizing the effects of a neoliberal globalized
economy. The current political moment is marked by uncertainty, as the global
community faces both an impending power transition between China and the
United States and an unprecedented, unpredictable global health crisis. More
than ever, an actor-centered approach that considers domestic elements is
necessary to understand not only the potential patterns of behavior for
individual states, but the policies that will shape an international system that
has, at its core, remained largely unchanged for almost eighty years.
CONCLUSION
The global community has seen the resurgence of populism all over the
globe. The faults of the neoliberal global economic system have generated
inequality at all levels. Compounded by political stress and economic shocks
like the housing crisis, this inequality has festered and surged to the fore
as a global rise in populism. Most of the discourse around populism has been
centered on right-wing populism. I have argued that it is important to
understand populism as a system, logic, or “thin-centered ideology” that
dynamically interacts with local ideologies and histories.
If we take a more dynamic perspective, populists in power are more
concerned with self- preservation and tend to centralize and personalize their
international behavior. This leads to variable policy outcomes; some states
may reinforce existing norms while others may seek to radically change the
system. Understanding and analyzing this behavior requires the use of an
actor-centered approach, rather than a generalized approach. ame theoretic
research by zg r zdamar could help scholars understand and model state
behavior by looking at the “microfoundations” of foreign policy, or regime
types, historical context, and even populist organizations within states.⁷⁵ This
way of understanding state behavior still leads to uncertainties in
international relations. conomic and political shocks, like the CO I -
crisis, have the potential to becomemoments of paradigm shift. opulist states
will be essential to understanding what this new paradigm will look like, but
their impact will not be as uniform as many scholars suggest. Instead, their
impact will depend on whether populist leaders see the existing system as
beneficial, regard China as a threat or an ally, and whether they are able to
successfully hold onto and exercise the power generated by the CO I -
crisis. This paper should inform the reader of some international concepts and
trends so that they may easier navigate the uncertainties of the near future.
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END NOTES (CONTINUED)
Though the rise of Tik Tok, -Pop, Al azeera and other non-US sources of cultural influence could be indicative
of a shift away from US cultural products.
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